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Abstract
Very recently, the use of chaos synchronization as a means of masking information
data in a network has been proposed. Although it is claimed that the security breach
is not possible and that the proposed encryption approach can be used to secure
communications over Internet, we prove that these claims are unfounded, and that
the cryptosystem can be broken in different ways.
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1 Introduction
During the last decade, there have been many proposals to apply non-linear
dynamical systems to cryptography and secure communications under the as-
sumption that chaotic orbits resemble random generators [1]. The well-known
Lorenz attractor has been repeatedly used as chaotic generator throughout
the years [2–7]. Most of these implementations have been totally or partially
broken using many different attacks [8–12]. The work presented in [13] uses
the chaotic masking approach based on the Lorenz attractor exactly in the
same way as first proposed in [3], but does not add any novelty nor enhance
in any way its security, robustness, or efficiency.
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In [13, §5], a simulation example is given. The communication system is de-
scribed by the following equations:
transmitter

x˙1 = σ(y1 − x1)
y˙1 = rx1 − y1 − x1z1
z˙1 = x1y1 − bz1
s(t) = x1 + i(t)
(1)
receiver

x˙2 = σ(y2 − x2)
y˙2 = rs(t)− y2 − z2s(t)
z˙2 = y2s(t)− bz2
iˆ(t) = s(t)− x2
(2)
where i(t) is the message or information signal to be masked, s(t) is the trans-
mitted or encrypted signal, and iˆ(t) is the decrypted information signal. In
[13, §5], the following parameter values are used: r = 28.0, σ = 10.0, and
b = 8/3. The information signal is i(t) = 10 cos(60t) cos(t).
In this work, we present still another attack on the allegedly secure system,
based on the spectrum analysis of the transmitted signal.
2 Description of the attack
Chaotic systems present some properties such as sensitive dependence on
parameters and on initial conditions, ergodicity, mixing, and dense periodic
points, which make them similar to pseudorandom noise. A fundamental re-
quirement of the pseudorandom noise used in cryptography is that its spec-
trum should be infinitely broad, flat, and of higher power density than the
signal to be concealed within. However, the cryptosystem proposed in [13]
does not satisfy this requirement.
In Fig. 1 the ciphertext logarithmic power spectra of the cryptosystem de-
scribed in [13, §5] is illustrated. It can be observed that the plaintext signal
clearly emerges at 59/(2pi) Hz and at 61/(2pi) Hz over the background noise
created by the Lorenz oscillator, with a power −4 dB relative to the maxi-
mum power of the ciphertext spectrum, while the power density of the masking
signal, for the same frequency, falls below −80 dB.
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Fig. 1. Power spectral density analysis of the ciphertext signal. The peaks at
59/(2pi) Hz and at 61/(2pi) Hz correspond to the plaintext frequency. The spec-
trum was calculated using a 4096-point Discrete Fourier Transform with a 4-term
Blackman-Harris window.
To break the system, the chaotic transmitter of the examples was simulated
with the same parameter values used in [13, §5]. To recover the plaintext no
chaotic receiver was used. Instead, the ciphertext was high-pass filtered. The
procedure is illustrated in Fig. 2. The result is a perfect estimation of the
plaintext. In fact, the plaintext presence in the ciphertext is so evident that
it can be appreciated even with the naked eye.
It should be emphasized that our analysis is a blind detection, made without
the least knowledge of what kind of non-linear time-varying system was used
for encryption, nor its parameter values, and neither its keys, if any. Other
avenues of attack are described in [8–12] and will not be repeated here.
3 Other weaknesses and inconsistencies found
3.1 Precision issues
In [13] the application of an analog encryption method to digital files is pro-
posed, but no indication is given about how to implement this encryption
process. We wonder how the described method, where a series of real number
is generated, can be used to encrypt digital values. We are not told in which
way the binary digits in the files are mixed with the chaotic orbit generated
by the Lorenz attractor. This should have been thoroughly explained.
On the other hand, once the information is encrypted, as it is an analogous
signal, it should be converted to a digital one to allow its transmission through
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Fig. 2. Plaintext recovery with ciphertext filtering attack. The high-pass filter em-
ployed was a four-pole Butterworth with a frequency cutoff of 33 rad/s. Time histo-
ries of: (a) x component of the Lorenz chaotic attractor; (b) the ciphertext, s(t); (c)
the plaintext, i(t) = 10 cos(60t) cos(t); (d) the recovered plaintext with a high-pass
filter.
the Internet. It should be clarified with how many bits per sample the con-
version will be implemented and how the limited precision may affect to the
chaotic transmission system.
3.2 The key
In [13] it is not specified what the key is. It is hinted that the key might consist
of the initial conditions of the chaotic system, but it is not clearly stated
which conditions, which their range is and what their precision or sensibility
is. Furthermore, the synchronization and thus the decryption are independent
of the initial conditions. Consequently, initial conditions should not be part of
the key.
4 Conclusions
In [13], the use of the Lorenz chaotic attractor was proposed for secure commu-
nications over Internet, but in the same way as introduced in classical papers
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such as [3]. Therefore, all the same mistakes that have been pointed out in the
past ten years are reproduced. We have presented an attack based on filtering
the ciphertext which successfully recovers the plaintext. Furthermore, we have
highlighted some other weaknesses and inconsistencies found in the proposed
secure communication system. As a consequence of this analysis, we conclude
that the system completely lacks security, it is impractical for the transmission
of digital data through a digital channel as is the Internet, and thus should
not be used for applications where security is a strong requirement.
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